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For many Asians, the progress made by the European Union (EU) and the strength
of the euro currency is something to admire, aspire to, and sometimes, scoff at. It’s
a double-edged sword, in a sense. On the one hand, East Asia needs to engage in
deeper integration economically and politically, but not necessarily in the ways
Europe or the Americas have. And on the other hand, Asia’s deep history and com-
plex bilateral relations with its neighbors has made it hard to all join hands and
form one big happy circle. But nonetheless, Asian or not, everyone seems to agree
that some form and degree of economic and political cooperation is necessary;
witness groups such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as numerous free trade
agreements (FTAs) that have popped up like mushrooms over the past several years. 
Can all of the bilateral and multilateral FTAs, as well as the nonbinding agree-
ments made within APEC and ASEAN, coexist effectively? How will that work?
What nation will step up to be the leader? What does East Asia need to do in order
to be a stronger economic, and therefore, political, force in the realm of the global
economy?
On February 14, 2005, the Center on Japanese Economy and Business (CJEB) of
Columbia Business School, the APEC Study Center of Columbia University, and 
the Mitsui USA Foundation sponsored this sixth annual Mitsui USA Symposium.
Presenters included Takatoshi Ito, Professor at the Graduate School of Economics
and Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Tokyo;
Peter Drysdale, Emeritus Professor of Economics, Visiting Fellow in Policy 
and Governance in the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, 
The Australian National University; Merit Janow, Professor in the Practice of
International Economic Law and International Affairs, School of International
and Public Affairs and Co-Director, APEC Study Center, Columbia University;
Hugh Patrick, Director, CJEB and Co-Director, APEC Study Center, Columbia
University; and David Weinstein, Carl. S. Shoup Professor of the Japanese
Economy, Department of Economics, Columbia University. 
This report is a summary of the evening’s presentations and discussions; it can
also be found at www.gsb.columbia.edu/japan. 
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INTRODUCTION
HUGH PATRICK
R. D. Calkins Professor of
International Business Emeritus
Director, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business 
Columbia Business School
It is my pleasure to welcomeyou to this exciting sympo-
sium on Japan, APEC, and East
Asian Economic Cooperation.
East Asia has been, and will
continue to be, the most
dynamic, rapidly growing
region in the world. 
First I want to express my
thanks to each of the panelists.
To Professor Peter Drysdale,
who has made a special stop-
over in New York today on his
trip from Australia to Honolulu
to be here for this symposium;
to Professor Takatoshi Ito, who
made a special trip from Japan
for this symposium, arriving
over the weekend and leaving
tomorrow; to Professor Merit
Janow, who has just returned
this weekend from a stint in
Geneva serving on the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO)
Dispute Settlement Appellate
Body; and to Professor David
Weinstein, who hasn’t had to
travel far to be here, and I hope
and trust will never have to
travel far to be here—since,
eventually, he will take on the
directorship of the Center on
Japanese Economy and
Business.
Second, I want to thank 
the Mitsui USA Foundation,
with which we have had this
important and successful 
collaboration for this annual
event for some years. 
PRESENTATION
TAKATOSHI ITO
Professor, Graduate School of
Economics and Research Center
for Advanced Science and
Technology, University of Tokyo
Ithink the progression ofEurope—the creation of the
European Union in 1999 and
the introduction of the euro
currency in 2001—was a shock
to Asia. It was a shock that all
those European countries could
get rid of their own currencies
and introduce a common cur-
rency in the region. Then why
not East Asia? 
The most current round of
WTO talks, which is called the
Doha Round, is going very
slowly because the tariffs are
now very low in advanced
countries, and the final package
deals with Japan’s most difficult
sectors, which are strongly con-
nected with our culture. That
takes time, which leaves coun-
tries and regions to devise their
own initiatives in addition to,
or in parallel with, the WTO
arrangement.
Asia, including Japan, has
been on the defensive because
the other players did not partic-
ipate in this region before 
the year 2000. So Asia is dis-
criminated against in Mexico,
the United States, and some
European countries. Asia has 
a disadvantage with tariffs and
their position regarding the
manufacturing of automobiles
and other goods, which are
produced by countries in the
North American Free Trade
Agreement or the EU. Large
Japanese corporations invested
directly in those countries so
that they could jump the tariff
barrier, but the smaller compa-
nies did not. However, even
large Japanese companies have
to import key parts and other
semifinished goods from Japan
for assembly in Mexico, and
they are subject to high tariffs.
Since American and EU coun-
tries can import parts free of
tariff, Japanese corporations
were at a disadvantage. That
was the reason why Japan pur-
sued the NAFTA with Mexico. 
If NAFTA extends to Central and
South America and if the EU
expands from 15 to 25 coun-
I think the 
progression of
Europe . . . was a
shock to Asia.
—Takatoshi Ito
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tries as planned and beyond,
Asia is left out of regional blocs
and is discriminated against.
And that, I think, is a very
strong motivation, though a
somewhat defensive one, for
Asian countries to create their
own regional arrangements. 
Regional, or interregional,
trade and investment have 
risen and are now as high as in
Europe. So a car assembled in
Thailand probably used parts
sent from Japan, but also parts
from the Philippines and elec-
tronic devices from Malaysia.
So a lot of semifinished goods
are going back and forth
among Asian countries. It
makes more sense if Asian
countries get together and 
eliminate tariffs on those semi-
finished goods and parts.
The difference between
East Asia and Europe is that
East Asia still depends on out-
side final markets, namely the
United States. So they trade
manufactured goods back and
forth within Asia, but when the
goods are finished, a substan-
tial portion of the final product
(not all of them) is exported to
the United States, so East Asia
still depends on the United
States as a final customer. 
But now even this is changing,
as China starts to absorb a lot
of the final goods from Asian
countries. China’s weight is
increasing: Japan exported to
China more than to the United
States in 2004. If this trend con-
tinues, obviously Asia will
become like Europe, and the
countries will export and
import from each other. The
circle will be closed, for better
or worse.
Now, this is an old story.
The Asian currency crisis in
1997 was a strong tipping point
for this region. As you recall,
the crisis spread from Thailand
to Indonesia and to Korea.
Many Asians realized that they
were all in the same boat, and
that they had to help each
other. As it turned out, the
United States did not assist any
of those countries bilaterally,
and the International Monetary
Fund, which was supposed to
help the countries in crisis, was
prescribing the wrong medi-
cine. This is a bit of a sweeping
generalization, but let me just
say that many Asian policymak-
ers and academics still remember
how the United States and IMF
caused difficulties in an already
difficult situation.
This sort of awareness came
about because of the Asian 
currency crisis, an awareness
that East Asia comprises one
investor classification and one
entity that have to help each
other out.
The euro, I think, was
pretty much a surprise in the
sense that nobody knew what
really to expect until it was
launched. In that sense, it was
a shock, and many skeptics,
especially in the United States,
were proven wrong when it
was a success. The launch went
smoothly, and I would say it is
doing extremely well. The cur-
rency is now on the minds of
investors as an alternative to
the U.S. dollar. The yen is far
behind in third place in terms
of usage of the currency, and 
it again looks like the United
States and Europe are the two
strongest economies, while Asia
is still fragmented within the
financial and economic world.
As I mentioned earlier,
when Mexico joined NAFTA,
Ford and Mercedes Benz were
able to import parts from their
headquarters to Mexico tariff
free, while Toyota and Honda
had to pay a 30 or 40 percent
tariff. So the disadvantage was
clear, a side effect of not joining
NAFTA.
Japanese businesses pushed
the Japanese government very
strongly to sign an FTA with
Mexico; it was finally done and
will be in effect soon. So now
Japanese corporations can
import parts and finished goods
from Japan tariff free. An equal
playing field has been created.
But this is just an example.
Other bilateral agreements with
other countries and in other
sectors can easily happen. This
is why I think that Japan and
other Asian countries are rush-
ing to sign bilateral FTAs to
forge strong economic ties with
North America, South America,
and Europe.
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Now, the FTAs in Japan and
Korea are, as I mentioned, very
recent phenomena. The Korea-
Chile FTA was the first for
Korea, while both Korea and
Japan also tried to have FTAs
with other Southeast Asian
countries. Right now, every-
thing is pretty much bilateral
initiatives, as Korea and Japan
try to find trading partners 
willing to enter into an FTA
agreement. China is pursuing 
a slightly different strategy. 
It wants an FTA with ten
Southeast Asian countries
together, at the same time. The
timetable is a little bit slower
but it is said to be more com-
prehensive. We don’t know 
the details, but the supposedly
comprehensive FTA with these
ten countries would be a uni-
form arrangement. China is also
pushing to start trade liberaliza-
tions with certain countries
earlier than the comprehensive
ones. So there’s a bit of a con-
flict, or rivalry, between China
and Japan in trying to get cer-
tain countries as their trading
partners. 
Japan is now trying to
develop FTAs for these reasons
I mentioned, and for additional
factors as well. The trade minis-
ters and academics are trying 
to push FTAs with Asian coun-
tries, but they are called
economic partnership agree-
ments, or EPAs. So some
agreements are called EPAs
instead of FTAs. What is the dif-
ference between an EPA and an
FTA? The EPA not only makes
tariffs zero, but also tries to
have a deeper integration
within two countries, including
legal issues. So, basically, it’s a
harmonization of regulations,
investment treaties, and taxes.
It’s called an EPA because
Japanese tariffs on manufac-
tured goods are already almost
zero. There’s a very strong
domestic resistance to FTAs
from the agriculture and fishery
sectors. For the Japan-Korea
FTA, everyone thought it would
be easy to sign one since both
countries have weak agricul-
tural sectors. But the Japanese
thought their agricultural sector
was stronger than Korea’s, and
vice versa. They both had this
illusion that opening agriculture
to each other wasn’t a problem,
but when they got close to an
agreement, they realized there
were problems with some
products. The Japanese have 
a problem with Korean fishing
boats, while Koreans worried
about the Japanese manufac-
tured goods flooding the
Korean market. Then Korea
took Japan to the WTO over
quota on nori, or seaweed,
imports, and now the Japanese
are very angry.
I think the Japan-Korea
agreement is getting delayed,
as well as the agreements with
Thailand and the Philippines,
even though the latter two
countries’ problems can be
worked out if there is political
will. So the negotiating process
that’s going on with these bilat-
eral FTAs is very interesting;
hopefully, Japan can conclude
a substantial portion of them
sometime this year.
PETER DRYSDALE
Emeritus Professor of Economics,
Visiting Fellow in Policy and
Governance in the Asia Pacific
School of Economics and
Government, The Australian
National University
Professor Ito provided usquite a complete back-
ground on the many things that
are taking place in East Asia on
the financial cooperation front,
and particularly on the trade
front. I won’t try to repeat
those details and draw my own
conclusions from them, but, 
in a sense, jump to the conclu-
sions. I’d like to focus on some
of the fractures, or some of the
difficulties that are emerging 
in the process of what I regard
as a fairly inevitable trend in
East Asia. What Professor Ito
described is something that 
has been driven by two sets of 
factors. He detailed the more
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the closer economic coopera-
tion within East Asia around the
period of the East Asian crisis,
and all that followed after that,
including the political relations
between the East Asian capi-
tals—Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing—
and all the capitals throughout
Southeast Asia, and Washington.
He also discussed the response
in East Asia to the problems
with trade policy negotiations
at the time, especially with the
collapse of the talks with the
WTO.
But of course all these
developments are the product
of a longer-term structural
change, the intensification of
trade relations, and the capital
movements within East Asia
that are bringing together a
much more integrated econ-
omy. Australia is very much a
part of this. If you look at the
Australian economy and at
these trade statistics Professor
Ito described, Australia is the
most East Asian of all the
economies in East Asia. It has 
a much higher share of its 
trade with other East Asian
economies than any other
economy in East Asia, including
Japan, China, Malaysia—you
name it. More than 70 percent
of our trade is with East Asia,
and for very obvious reasons.
We have a very complementary
economy with Northeast Asia,
based on raw materials—or the
supply and the strategic supply
of raw materials. More than half
of Japan’s strategic raw materials
are drawn from Australia; this 
is also true for Korea and now,
increasingly, China, too, with
the big energy deals that are
being done. That’s the way of
the future for Australia also.
At what point is East Asia
now? I want to emphasize the
big shift on the trade policy
front that has taken place in the
last half-decade or more. That’s
a shift toward bilateralism in
East Asia. It’s a path that started
from a long traditional commit-
ment by Japan in particular to
the multilateral system (in terms
of the commitment to over-
come discrimination), through
Article 1 of the GATT in the
postwar period, but it goes way
back to the redressing of the
unequal treaties between Japan
and the great powers of the
early Meiji period.
There has been a sudden
shift in the long-term political
and economic interest for
Japan. This didn’t all happen
because of the instigation by
Japan. Of course, the significant
move away from multilateralism
to some extent in East Asia
really started with the response
to NAFTA. The idea floating
around in the 1990s was that if
North America could break all
the rules that have been held
so dear in the postwar period
through the Atlantic Charter,
then why can’t we also do it in
East Asia? That was a silly idea,
frankly, from the viewpoint of
East Asia’s own interests, but it
was an idea that came naturally
to the political surface in East
Asia and stayed there. Japan
resisted it for some time, but
then that resistance broke
down dramatically during the
financial crisis and then around
the collapse of the WTO’s
Seattle Ministerial meeting.
The other complication is
Washington’s dealing across the
Pacific with its East Asian part-
ners. The politics of all this are
really quite important. What is
amazing to me is how the FTAs
got off the ground. The very
important political reality is 
that this “partnership” between
Beijing and Tokyo came
together in a period of uncer-
tainty about dealings across 
the Pacific with Washington. 
It essentially came together
when Beijing needed to take
out some kind of insurance
policy against potential prob-
lems with Washington.
Of course, the go-between
in that important process was
Seoul, and the coming together
of ASEAN + 3 had the political
principle to stimulate it. The
political interests in Beijing,
Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington
are critical to the long-term
future of the ordered develop-
ment of East Asian economic
integration.
The shift has been dramatic.
Professor Ito mentioned the
deal that first ended Tokyo’s
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ments, the one with Singapore.
Now, that deal and most of the
deals, including the one with
Mexico, that have been done
are economically insignificant.
It might be symbolically signifi-
cant, however; it might signal
that down the road they will be
important in the way the region
conducts its trade policy affairs.
However, in terms of economic
impact, all of these deals that
have been negotiated so far 
are trivial. Perhaps there is one
exception, one that my own
country concluded and signed
in at the beginning of this year
with the United States, which,
interestingly, was a conse-
quence of these earlier moves
in East Asia. We wouldn’t have
got into that deal if things hadn’t
fallen apart the way they did 
in Northeast Asia. A lot of us 
in Australia became extremely
worried about that development
for those reasons.
The political context of
these preferential deals is really
very important in understanding
where they’ve come from, and
where they might go in the
future. Let me put the headlines
at the beginning and try to
explain this later on. We’ve got
an East Asian movement going
on here without a coherent
East Asian strategy, although
Professor Ito rightly described 
it in a way that looks fairly
ordered. I want to draw atten-
tion to the problems. I’m totally
sympathetic with the enterprise
because this is a thing that had
to happen historically. Without
more dialogue, without more
institutional cooperation
between East Asian neighbors
and ourselves in the Western
Pacific, we’re bound to have
problems down the road, but
there are serious problems on
the way to getting to a set order
to the relationships as well.
What’s the problem with
bilateralism? If it’s serious bilat-
eralism, the problem concerns
preferential arrangements; they
involve preferences against out-
siders. They’re bilateral and
therefore don’t encompass
everybody. Professor Ito told
us, appropriately, that the
whole East Asian enterprise is
one that involves increasing
integration across the
economies of East Asia, with
East Asia becoming like
Europe. How can East Asia
become like Europe, which has
a common and single market, 
if East Asia has a whole set of
bilateral deals that involve 
discrimination against other
partners within the region? 
As I say this, they’re not deeply
entrenched yet, but if they do
become deeply entrenched,
then that’s a major problem for
the integration of the entire
region. This is especially true 
in a region in which the
strength, the engine, the force
of economic growth involve
specialization across a whole
range of processes in produc-
tion. We call it “fragmentation
trade”: processing this in China,
delivering that to Taiwan, deliv-
ering it to Korea, and then back
to Taiwan, to Japan, and so 
on, and exporting it to global
markets.
Indeed, if you look at East
Asian integration, as Professor
Ito observed, on average, 
50 to 60 percent of East Asian
economies trade is with other
East Asian economies, which is
by far the largest proportion of
final goods trade compared
with the rest of the world. Most
of the intra–East Asian trade is
intermediate goods trade or
components goods trade, as
you would expect from sensi-
ble and efficient specialization
among these economies in East
Asia. If you cut the opportunity
for that specialization within
the region through bilateral 
and discriminatory preferential
arrangements, then you cut off
the source of the very thing
you’re trying to foster. That’s
the really big problem we face
potentially down the road.
Can we find a way out of
the potential mess of these
preferential arrangements mul-
tiplying in East Asia? What are
the next steps? Is this truly, as
some people have argued, a
process of competitive liberal-
ization, which will eventually
widen into a broader East Asian
arrangement?—something, 
for example, that eliminates
discrimination and preferences
In terms of 
economic impact,
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of a bilateral kind but broadens
into a European type integra-
tion arrangement?
The step from one set of
arrangements to another, how-
ever, is not easy. Getting from
point A to point B is what we
have to think about very care-
fully.
The North American model
was very important in stimulat-
ing this process. It was an
unfortunate model from the
viewpoint and circumstances in
East Asia, since these circum-
stances really recommended 
a stronger focus on the global
market. That’s what initially
drove the formation of APEC,
with its emphasis on opening
up the region. The emphasis
was on negotiating through the
WTO and, earlier, in the GATT.
Initially, the whole purpose 
of APEC was to engineer the
acceleration of settlements
through the Uruguay Round,
including those of great impor-
tance; fixing the East Asian
economies, including getting
rid of the comprehensive
Multifibre Agreement (MFA);
and removing the restrictions
on trade of labor-intensive
manufactured goods like tex-
tiles and clothing.
East Asian interests were,
and remain, global interests. So
if this process in East Asia is to
strengthen East Asian integra-
tion, then ultimately it’s got to
emphasize those global inter-
ests. The swing in Japan and
elsewhere to preferential bilat-
eralism could be the first step
that encourages effective, com-
petitive liberalization. But it’s
not likely that it will do that. 
The proliferation of initia-
tives is a real problem. As I
said, Australia has joined the
game, and, at one point, it
looked like we had no one to
play with at all. Japan quickly
started proposing various 
bilateral FTAs but not with
Australia, because, obviously,
we’re an agricultural supplier. 
If we entered a FTA with Japan,
we would have to seriously
consider the liberalization of
the agricultural sector in Japan.
So that wasn’t on, and it still
isn’t. And the same problem, of
course, occurs with Korea in
the negotiation of these things. 
So where did Australia go?
It went to the Association of
South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), but ASEAN wasn’t too
keen on Australia politically at
the time. Then Australia went
to the United States, and, of
course, with September 11, and
with political circumstances as
they were, it encouraged the
rapid negotiation of what is a
very messy, and a not very lib-
eralized, FTA with the United
States. In fact, all the independ-
ent studies of the Australia-U.S.
FTA suggest that, on balance,
it’s either neutral or trade
diverting. It’s not a very posi-
tive FTA at all, but it’s a very
important one symbolically. It’s
a particularly big thing more on
the investment side than on the
trade side, so we’re into that.
Subsequently, however,
there has been significant
rethinking on these issues in
Australia. We’ve initiated the
beginning of a study for the
potential negotiation of an FTA
with China, and that will be
very significant if it is ever
brought to pass. An FTA with
ASEAN has come back to the
agenda; Australia and ASEAN
are committed to the conclu-
sion of an FTA. So we’re in this
game in a big way now as well.
China’s FTA strategies in all
of this are very important. As
Professor Ito said, China’s strat-
egy with respect to ASEAN has
been different from Japan’s 
and that of the United States,
because it has taken ASEAN as
a whole. Essentially, the politi-
cal policymakers in Beijing
won out over the economic
ones in moving forward with
an FTA with ASEAN, because
China, as it grew and emerged,
had a political problem with
ASEAN. China wanted to take a
political initiative with ASEAN,
especially in the context of
Japan’s approach and, in a
sense, politically trumped 
Japan by taking this big step 
of an FTA with ASEAN. It will
take longer to negotiate, as
Professor Ito said, but already
some early harvest actions have
been taken within the frame-
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that problem exists in the same
way that it does at the moment,
it’s really very difficult to make
progress on a broader East
Asian FTA. So what we have
around this political structure is
the emergence of a set of eco-
nomic arrangements that are
being entrenched around at
least two, perhaps three really
true competing hubs in East
Asia: the China hub, the Japan
hub, and, perhaps, in a minor
little way, the Korean hub.
So what’s the state of play
in East Asia? We have compet-
ing preferences, we have hubs
and spokes emerging in East
Asia across the Pacific. The 
origins of these arrangements
are so complicated that to try 
to reach out and broaden 
their scope would be a major
enterprise. Imagine trying to
encompass NAFTA in a broader
East Asian or Asia-Pacific
arrangement, as some people
here in the United States and
also in Canada have suggested
in recent times. 
The current entrenchment
of these hubs-and-spokes
arrangements in East Asia has a
big cost to East Asian integra-
tion and growth. So there are
worries here, if not inevitable
difficulties, to overcome. If you
look at what’s happened in 
East Asia, you see that China
was one hub and Japan was
another. These arrangements
have Japan reaching out
through ASEAN, China reaching
out to ASEAN, Australia now
linking into ASEAN, and so on.
The United States is starting to
make its way across the Pacific
into negotiations with ASEAN
as well.
Is there an exit strategy?
Well, at the moment, there’s a
model that will help free the
entrapment of the hubs and
spokes in the region. Some
have suggested that a broader
free-trade area in the Pacific, 
or a trade area in East Asia, has
its difficulties. I talked about
the broader free-trade area of
Asia and the Pacific. Perhaps 
if this is driven by the United
States, it might be a way of 
getting out of the mist. But this
is where the APEC problem
emerges. You can try that, but
it’s bound to fail. All the bilater-
ally sensitive arrangements are
hardly going to be settled in
the near term. The result of
avoiding having to deal with
any of this is the creation of
these bilateral arrangements
replicated numerous times in
the Asia Pacific enterprise.
What we’ve done in a lot of
these bilateral arrangements
could be done again here. 
We could negotiate something,
fail, but declare success. That’s
what we do in many of these
arrangements and that’s what
we might do in the broader
Asia Pacific deal, avoiding
everything of importance. But
of course that would bring the
whole Asia Pacific enterprise
So significant changes have
already taken place in the
structure of trade between
ASEAN and China, which
directly affect third parties like
Australia, for example. 
The politics of trumping
Japan and Southeast Asia, I
might say, were certainly not
contemplated by the negotia-
tors in Japan of the initial
moves toward FTAs. It just 
wasn’t on the horizon that
China would get into this game.
China, as you will recall, had
just arduously negotiated its
succession into the WTO. 
But now China is a big player
in the FTA game and emerges
because of its strength and 
its potential as a serious, 
important, competing hub in
East Asia. It’s been involved 
in the process of extending 
its FTA arrangements through
its dealings with Hong Kong. 
It has ambitions to develop 
the FTA strategy as leverage
when dealing with the United
States, while also articulating
the notion of a broader East
Asian FTA, although that’s 
obviously not on the cards
among Japan, Korea, and 
China at this stage.
Why isn’t it in the cards?
Because, importantly—and I
now come back to the political
issue—there is a big black hole
in Northeast Asia. The big black
hole is the nature of political
relationships that persist between
Tokyo and Beijing. As long as
The big black hole
(in Northeast Asia)
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into question. The Asia-Pacific
enterprise in the form of APEC
is still a deep and valuable
exercise, not only in economic
dialogue, but also, increasingly,
in political dialogue encom-
passing all the major players
across the Pacific. 
One funny strategy is what
we call the single market issue.
When you apply it through Asia
and the Pacific, it might have
more sense than it looks to
have at first sight. Europe came
to the single market after it did
the trade liberalizations or the
trade regionalization thing. But
why do you have to do that?
There are a lot of issues that
APEC has been fairly good at
focusing on, like trade facilita-
tion and distant facilitation
issues that really constitute the
idea of a single market.
In terms of the impact on
trade efficiency, the single 
market agenda is much more
attractive than trying to go
down some preferential trade
group route across the Pacific.
If you measure the impact of
APEC, which often is said not
to have much force in terms of
its economic effect, but rather
in terms of diplomatic dialogue,
trade efficiency has been quite
significant since the establish-
ment of APEC in the early
1990s through the early twenty-
first century. Trade efficiency
for APEC has improved quite
considerably over this relatively
short period, and it’s improved
faster than trade efficiencies in
other parts of the world.
So APEC has had a positive
effect. If you use that data, for
example, in the last five years
or so the APEC effect on trade
growth has been on the order
of $50 billion or so a year, so
it’s not a trivial matter. That’s a
product of the trade liberaliza-
tions encouraged unilaterally
and of other initiatives of APEC,
but it’s also a product of trade
and investment facilitation
efforts that have been put in
place by APEC.
Coming back finally to
FTAs, frankly, there’s no good
FTA without a sunset clause. 
A free-trade area is hopefully a
stepping-stone toward general
multilateral free trade. You do 
it with somebody you like, and
then you try to extend it to the
rest of the world if you’re really
trying sincerely to make trade
free, rather than to protect
some special interests within a
discriminatory type of arrange-
ment. But none of the FTAs
have sunset clauses. There’s no
provision in the WTO for them
to be eliminated or multilateral-
ized, and the likelihood that 
we can get that reform into 
the WTO is still fairly remote.
There aren’t any rules or 
commitments to multilateralize,
although there are actually one
or two examples in which there
has been some commitment 
to do so. One of them is the
ASEAN agreement in which not
every ASEAN member, but
most of the ASEAN partners,
have committed to multilateral-
ize their liberalization steps
taken with their ASEAN part-
ners. It’s a scheduled phase of
liberalization, and that’s been
quite successful as a mecha-
nism for broader liberalization
of the ASEAN economies.
A similar thing happened
with commitment to the Closer
Economic Relations (CER)
Trade Agreement between
Australia and New Zealand, but
in a slightly different way. The
power of vested interest in
such arrangements once they
get established is very strong.
It’s very difficult to persuade
American producers of motor
cars in the Australian market 
to liberalize car imports, espe-
cially once FTAs contain really
specific rules of origin that
undermine the Australian motor
vehicle import market. Things
like this entrench these sorts of
arrangements with the specific
rules of origin and with the
preferential treatment for the
parties to the program. 
So what’s a way through
this? One way might be to use
one of these deals that are sig-
nificant to break the logjam by
incorporating a multilateraliza-
tion provision that contains an
automatic sign-on provision.
This actually has been intro-
duced in the ongoing debate
about the arrangement between
Australia and China. Frankly, 
A free-trade area 
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I am not personally at all 
optimistic that those who 
are advocating this position,
including myself, can be very
effective or persuasive, but it is
now being debated seriously.
The possibility is, for example,
that we might do the most 
nimble of rules of origin
arrangements with China. We
have the New Zealand arrange-
ments and we can extend them
to China. China has the ASEAN
arrangements that can be
extended to us, and we have
an automatic sign-on clause for
anybody who is prepared to
join this arrangement on essen-
tially the same terms. If you
could get an arrangement that’s
significant, that would likely
make a trade agreement with
China be quite significant. An
arrangement like that could
help to break the logjam.
China-Australia is one 
possibility. Australia-ASEAN is
another opportunity. The idea
here would be to join up with
Japan and Korea in these vari-
ous arrangements and extend
them into an open East Asian
free-trade arrangement. North
America would find it very hard
to join this, given the nature of
the arrangements embedded 
in NAFTA. So it would tend to
entrench a broader East Asian
arrangement, and that would
be good in terms of the difficul-
ties that the bilateral agree-
ments present for East Asian
integration and its future. But
the rest of the world’s prob-
lems, of course, have to be
dealt with finally through WTO
negotiations. 
So these arrangements, if
they were put in place, would
involve open membership and
a transparent review of the
processes of protection that 
are involved. 
In conclusion, I have a
great deal of sympathy for the
vision that Professor Ito laid out
in his presentation about the
deeper, wider, and closer inte-
gration within East Asia. At the
same time, there are risks in the
character and the direction of
East Asian trade diplomacy, in
particular. At the moment, these
risks cannot be discounted.
They’re very serious, which
need a significant initiative to
turn around. There are one or
two strategic opportunities, 
but I must say that delivering 
a breakthrough, for example,
on the Australia-China deal, is
going to be pretty difficult. It
will be a big deal if we can do
it, let alone incorporate some
novel provision like multilater-
alization of the preferential
treatment that we extend to
each other. 
The provisions to multilater-
alize would be great. Frankly,
that would be consistent with
China’s ultimate interests,
because China’s choice has got
to be a global trading system
one in the final analysis. It can’t
rely or focus entirely on the
East Asian or any other region,
simply because of the scale and
weight that its economy will
have in the world over time.
A movement in this 
direction will help maintain
important and, hopefully, posi-
tive leverage on the United
States and Europe. APEC will
continue to remain significant
in this process, because it con-
tinues to be the most important
vehicle for both the economic
and political dialogue between
the major players in East Asia
and the Pacific. The key thing
to all of this is that the East
Asian effort will ultimately
show more and more strength
if the political impasse between
Beijing and Tokyo can be
resolved. The broader East
Asian and Pacific enterprise will
continue to complement what-
ever East Asia wants to achieve
through its own integration.
DISCUSSION
MERIT JANOW
Professor in the Practice of
International Economic Law and
International Affairs, School of
International and Public Affairs;
Co-Director, APEC Study Center,
Columbia University
China’s choice 
has got to be 
a global trading
system one in the
final analysis.
—Peter Drysdale
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I’m wearing my professor’shat today in reaction to the
fine presentations that preceded
this comment. 
Let me offer six observa-
tions that may punctuate what
has been said before and that
mostly speak to certain obser-
vations about FTAs in general,
and make one small sugges-
tion. These thoughts are
offered in the context of the
following general observation: 
I think the train has left the sta-
tion. There was a time when
one could say that FTAs were
not a good thing and raise 
various concerns about them
with the thought of turning the
clock back or stopping the
train. I don’t think that’s possi-
ble any more. As you’ve seen,
there has been a vast prolifera-
tion of FTAs and additional
negotiations in Asia and else-
where around the world. Given
the number of them that are in
place, bilateral and regional
free trade agreements are now
an economic and political 
reality.
The question in my mind 
is not what judges, but rather
what policymakers and nego-
tiators, can do at this point to
discipline and harmonize these
regional arrangements. First, 
as the previous speakers have
already mentioned indirectly,
FTAs have an economic dimen-
sion, but they also have a
distinct political dimension as
well. I see that political feature
as particularly important in
Asia. This is not to belittle 
the economic one, but it is
intended to acknowledge that
the political dimension is
important. In this regard, I
recall the words of Long Yongtu,
the former vice minister of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation
(MOFTEC). Once when asked
why China expressed a sympa-
thetic inclination toward FTAs
at a moment when it had just
joined the WTO and was trying
to bring its system into compli-
ance with WTO obligations, 
he observed that there was so
much anxiety in Asia about the
peaceful rise of China, that any-
thing that China could do to
demonstrate that it viewed its
prosperity as tied to the pros-
perity of the region was in
China’s national interest. I
thought that was a very insight-
ful and interesting remark.
China’s role in regional
FTAs is extremely intriguing
and very nuanced, as Professor
Drysdale outlined, and also
quite pivotal. So indeed, the
economic motivation is there to
deepen economic integration,
but it seems to me that the
political dimension is as impor-
tant for some nations. Japan or
Australia, for example, appear
to strongly favor these arrange-
ments, in no small measure
because they do not wish to be
left of out any regionalization
that occurs. My second point is
that I see FTAs as expressions
of dissatisfaction with the multi-
lateral system and the pace of
multilateral negotiations. Many
think multilateral agreements
proceed too slowly. There’s also
a desire to lock in preferences.
That’s the businessperson’s way
of thinking: “NAFTA discrimi-
nates against us, even though
we’re a major investor in Mexico,”
Japanese firms say. Why should
we be at a disadvantage? We
need to have those same pref-
erences locked in for us. 
What is less clear to me is
whether these regional arrange-
ments will prove to be a spur
to the multilateral process.
Some do argue this, and, of
course, Professor Drysdale
alluded to the argument that
one hears in the United States,
that these FTAs will result in
competitive liberalization. Some
point to NAFTA as having given
a push to the Uruguay Round.
Some even see APEC as a spur
to the Uruguay Round. It is
possible that these arrange-
ments will spur multilateral
liberalization, but I think the
jury is still out on that question. 
A third observation is that I
don’t see these FTAs dealing
with certain very hard issues.
Professor Ito has suggested that
they do allow for experimenta-
tion. There is a view within
Japan that you can start work-
ing on issues that are difficult,
such as agriculture, case by
case. The agricultural folks will








get worn out through this
process, it is sometimes argued.
I don’t see it. Where is the 
evidence? The Australia-U.S.
FTA has significant exclusions.
Japan-Singapore had difficulty
with even goldfish. So, at this
point, I am a skeptic that the
issues which are very difficult
to liberalize domestically can
be addressed through bilateral
or regional FTAs.
As the only lawyer on the
panel with economists, I dare
say my fourth observation is 
an economic one. The World
Bank has just produced another
study arguing that the economic
benefits of these FTAs are not
advancing global economic
welfare. The work I’ve been
reading by the World Bank 
and elsewhere are trying to 
say these FTAs are really not
proving to be that helpful to
the developing world. Indeed,
in some cases, they are erecting
trade barriers for the develop-
ing world. So if we’re concerned
about the developing world, is
this in the global interest?
I guess the fifth observation
is that these agreements are 
not neutral policy. What I mean
is the rules of origin and tariffs
have their own distortions.
Moreover, embedded in these
FTAs are alternative regulatory
frameworks that are very com-
plicated. They’re reflected in
how you deal with telecoms, 
e-commerce, and other serv-
ices, which have their own
competitive and regulatory
issues. Many of the U.S. tem-
plates are advancing regulatory
objectives on labor and the
environment. So these are not
neutral templates. Different
FTAs are advancing alternative
templates, and I think that adds
another complexity. For some,
that’s exactly the reason for
doing it. For others, it injects a
degree of caution.
The final observation is that
I don’t believe that these FTAs
won’t have a cost for the multi-
lateral system. There are many
reasons why the multilateral
agenda has not advanced as
some may have hoped. Among
the reasons is that there are
very hard issues on the 
multilateral agenda, notably
agriculture. But there are also
challenging issues. I don’t think
these regional agreements are
costless for the multilateral
process—many may not be
trade diverting—but they are
surely attention diverting by 
my way of thinking.
So what can be done about
this? One small idea that I hope
will be considered has its 
origins in some writings by
European economists. I think it
would be very useful for econ-
omists—I would pick the four
right here to get us started—to
ask themselves and develop the
checklist on what would need
to be contained in regional
trade agreements that are truly
comprehensive. What would
that look like? What would they
have to contain? Economists
need to develop a methodolog-
ical template so that we could
evaluate the 300 or so FTAs 
out there. The regional trade
committee at the WTO hasn’t
been able to evaluate FTAs, 
to say this is consistent with
general objectives or not, in
part perhaps because there 
hasn’t been a template that 
was agreed on. So I think one
thing that could be constructive
is if there could be a private
sector initiative that would 
evaluate what these FTAs could
and should look like if they
were to be consistent with, at
least, the goals of Article 24 of
the WTO Agreement. 
HUGH PATRICK
I want to make five points,and then I’d like to speak
briefly about U.S. policy. First,
the really interesting trend that
everybody has pointed out is
how much economic integra-
tion has already occurred
within Asia and how useful and
important that has been. I want
to remind everybody that this
occurred within the context
and because of the multilateral
trading system of GATT and,
now, the WTO. Everybody got
access to each other’s markets
because of the existence of 
the global system, and they
depended on and broadened 
it without having preferential
I am a skeptic 
that the issues 
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arrangements. One might ask
the question, “Will preferential
arrangements further enhance
what’s already an excellent
process, or is it going to retard
it?” My view is that it’s going to
retard it. We tend to forget that
the basic system works very
well in bringing about precisely
what everybody says is so
important.
Second, I’ll remind you that
the textbook view of the first
and best system for trade is a
global multilateral system in
which anybody can sell to the
best markets and buy from the
cheapest ones. The FTAs are a
poor second best; the smaller
they are, the more bilateral they
are, and the worse they are.
The dilemma of course, is the
political reality that the train
has already left the station, as
Professor Janow emphasized.
We’re going to have more FTAs,
and they’re going to have more
specific rules of origin that are




intertwining of specific proce-
dures that are very hard to
separate (in Asia, it’s now
called the “noodle bowl
effect”). This is a very funda-
mental difficulty when we
examine the rules of origin. So
that’s my second point, that
we’re on a bad path. How do
we get out of it? I think we will
mess it up so badly for the next
15 years that we will finally
learn that we’ve got to go back
to multilateralism. 
My third point is that
ASEAN +3 is fundamentally a
political organization as is indi-
cated by its very membership.
It excludes important regional
players for political reasons; 
it excludes Australia on the
grounds that it’s Australia. It
also excludes the United States
for what the members presum-
ably consider to be important
reasons. If you look at the 
economic substance of what
ASEAN + 3 has achieved, it is 
in its initial phase of long-term
development. On a scale of 1
to 100, I would say ASEAN + 3
has moved from 1 to 2. So it
has a long way to go. On the
other hand, I think ASEAN + 3
is very important because it
creates and enhances a policy
dialogue among policymakers
from various Asian countries
who don’t know very much
about each other and don’t
trust each other very much. So
this dialogue process is incredi-
bly important, but it’s a very
long-run proposition. We use
the European model, but
remember, it took two wars
and 50 years after that for
France and Germany to really
determine they had to work
together. I don’t know how
long it will be for China and
Japan, and what it will take. 
I hope to God it’s not war, but
if you think more narrowly,
before countries can engage in
an economic integration that is
institutionalized along the lines
that have been discussed here,
they have to not only know a
lot more about each other, but
they require fantastic changes
in the international and domes-
tic institutional frameworks,
agricultural policies, and so
forth. They have to generate a
lot more trust among each
other than I think exists today.
My fourth point is that
APEC has had and will con-
tinue to have a very important
role, because it’s the only eco-
nomic institution in the Asia
Pacific that includes the United
States. The involvement of the
United States is very important
both for Asia and for the U.S.
One of the interesting by-prod-
ucts of the APEC process has
been the creation of the Annual
Leader’s Summit meeting, and
that’s become, for rather differ-
ent reasons, a very important
institution, valuable in itself.
My final point is that I don’t
think the United States has
played a very constructive role
in developing and pursuing a
global economic agenda. The
dilemma in democratic societies
is that it is easier for trade
negotiators to deliver a bilateral
FTA within the term of their
elected leader—president or
prime minister—than it is to
deliver a Doha Round, which 
is by nature a much more 
difficult, more complicated
On a scale of 
1 to 100, I would
say ASEAN + 3 
has moved 
from 1 to 2.
—Hugh Patrick
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negotiation, but more important
and the right way to go.
In terms of where the
United States fits into all of this,
we have to ask, what role do
the East Asian countries want
the U.S. to play? I think almost
all of them, except perhaps
China, want the it to play an
important security role as a 
balance and stabilizer based 
on its military power. To obtain
that commitment, they also
need the United States to be 
an important economic player
in East Asia, so that business
interests will lobby to say that
Asia is important in U.S.
national interests. 
What does the United States
want, and what should it want?
Obviously, we want peace,
security, stability and coopera-
tion on antiterrorism, and don’t
discount how important antiter-
rorism is in the U.S.-Asian
agenda. Certainly, we want
access to Asian markets.
Fundamentally, in terms of
trade policy, the United States
should be refocusing on the
Doha Round and moving it
ahead, rather than using our
negotiating capabilities on
these bilateral agreements and
tying up the even more limited
negotiating capabilities of our
bilateral trading partners.
ASEAN +3 provides a won-
derful opportunity for the three
to get together and talk with
each other, using ASEAN more
or less as camouflage. What’s
particularly important in a 
political or geopolitical sense is
the U.S.-Japan-China triangle,
which is becoming increasingly
important, economically and
politically. Economically, we
have huge trade relationships,
and not just bilaterally. There
are lots of Japanese compo-
nents in the Chinese products
that are exported to the U.S.
market. American and Japanese
foreign direct investments are
rising in China, and that’s going
to be increasingly important. 
When we look ahead ten
years, we’re going to see the
Chinese increasing their invest-
ments abroad, as China tries 
to get natural resources on the
one hand and technology on
the other. The IBM sale of its
PC business to a Chinese com-
pany is indicative of that. So we
have all sorts of reasons why
the combination of Chinese
economic growth and strength
of the large Japanese economy
will provide the United States
with opportunities for increas-
ing its Asian economic inter-
actions to its benefit. On the
other hand, political tensions
are likely to increase. China
and Japan are rivals for 
leadership in East Asia. Both
countries are becoming increas-
ingly nationalistic about each
other, labeling the other the
bad guy, and that’s very unfor-
tunate. The U.S.-Japan alliance
is tight and strong and will con-
tinue to be for the foreseeable
future, because it’s in the inter-
est of both countries, politically
as well as economically.
For the United States, the
big question is how to respond
to the inevitable rise of China
as an economic power. As we
know, economic powers also
invest in their military simply
for defensive reasons because
they have the money. So China
will also rise as a military
power. The big problem for 
the United States is how to 
integrate China into the global
economic and political system.
China’s entrance into the WTO
is extremely important, and the
country’s gradual entrance into
global private capital markets is
increasingly important also. So,
on the economic dimension,
we’re moving ahead. On the
political dimension, there’s a
tension in the United States
even on how to think what 
our strategic involvement with
China should be. China is
already important in global pol-
itics because it’s a permanent
member of the United Nations
Security Council. We have to
move from a G7 to a G8 in
order to incorporate China
politically much more than in
the past. 
TAKATOSHI ITO 
I’m not sure how I shouldrespond to this, particularly
to Hugh’s romantic line of argu-
ment. I think I have to bring
him to the hard reality of the
China and Japan
are rivals 
for leadership in 
East Asia.
—Hugh Patrick
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world and the two ways of
looking at the FTA. You can
either look at it as a bad thing
that makes trade diversions and
other harmful things, or, you
could look at it as a wonderful
thing, a deepening of economic
relations that was not possible
for political, social, or other
reasons. In the end, the FTA
will be a building block for 
the WTO.
Suppose the FTA is a bad
thing. Well, NAFTA is bad when
it discriminates against Asia, so
why can’t Asia get its countries
together and defend itself?
Then we’ll basically have lever-
age with NAFTA and the EU
and will also become much
more open to the rest of the
world. So that is justified.
Suppose the FTA is a good
thing, as you heard in the dis-
cussion about NAFTA being a
building block of deep integra-
tion of the world economy, 
an ultimate goal of the WTO. 
In the end, hard concessions
can be given to neighbors, 
but that’s the beginning of the
opening. So it’s a step forward,
which is a wonderful thing.
If that is the case, then why
doesn’t Asia try that strategy
too? Maybe it’s difficult for the
Japanese rice grower to give
concessions to the United
States, but maybe the Japanese
rice grower can stand the inva-
sion of certain rice grains from
Asia. This, at least, opens up
the market, and the consumers
get to try these different grains.
Maybe 30 or 40 years down the
road, the Japanese rice market
can be open to the American
rice market. But you have to
start this with trustful neighbors
and friends. 
By the way, I think the United
States is bullying Japan on the
beef issue. That kind of bully-
ing doesn’t help with the sense
of trust, especially on agricul-
tural issues. That’s why I think
an FTA with the United States is
not on the agenda for Japan.
PETER DRYSDALE
I agree entirely withProfessor Janow and with
Professor Patrick that we now
have a real systemic problem
with the FTAs, and there’s 
nothing that surprises me at all
about the outcome. What I
argued was that we have a real
problem, because contrary to
the enterprise we all support,
what these things are doing is
driving a wedge down the mid-
dle of East Asian integration
between China and Japan.
That’s complicated enough in
its political dimension already,
and so to unravel that either
requires some grand political
initiative or pragmatic initiative
of the kind that I described,
though the probability of that,
I’ve got to say, is below 50 per-
cent at this stage. It may be
rising slightly, but it is below 
50 percent, because it requires
a grand political initiative.
The grand political initiative
is not on the rise, and it may
lead to some disturbance,
external or internal, but it’s not
on the agenda yet. So we’ve
got to think about how to
break through on this front.
That involves thinking seriously
again about how to tie up the
preferential agreements and
make them contribute to
strengthening the global 
system in which East Asia, 





Given the fact that bothChina and Japan are 
trying to secure their energy
resources and compete in other
areas at the same time, will
their political deterioration spill
over to trade?  
PETER DRYSDALE
I think the energy issue islooming as one of the
biggest issues confronting
Northeast Asian politics, secu-
rity, and economics. Certainly,
dealing with that in a construc-
tive framework is what we 
all have an interest in doing.
Australia is the second biggest
energy supplier to Northeast
Asia, next to Saudi Arabia. 
It has a particular interest in
that and will be playing the
The Japanese 
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most constructive role we 
possibly can. Australia has its
brief moment of glory in
respect to China now because
of our attractiveness as an
energy supplier. The scale of
what is going on there is huge,
and over the next ten or twenty
years or so there will be spec-
tacular developments in our
energy trade relationships with
China.
I hope this can be used to
broaden structures which are
cooperative regarding energy
issues in Northeast Asia, since
Australia already has a deep,
wide, and established energy
trade relationships with Japan
and Korea. 
The relationship between
Japan and China is getting
worse, and it’s difficult, but I
could see the solution to the
problem. It has to be packaged.
List what Japan wants, list what
China wants, and somebody,
like maybe Korea or the United
States, has to be mediate, so
that both sides get what they
want. 
HUGH PATRICK
We have to realize that,fundamentally, the 
economic relationship between
China and Japan is complemen-
tary, not competitive, so that it’s
very beneficial to both sides,
reflecting the difference in the
level of development and
wealth. Similarly, Japan with
Southeast Asia is, on the whole,
very complementary, not com-
petitive. China is more directly
competitive with Southeast
Asia, not so much in their
resources trade, but, particu-




Many people haveobserved that Europe
had to wait for the proper
acceptance of the relative rela-
tionships of France, Germany,
Italy, and Britain for their
regional alignment to work. 
If that’s so, then what is the
prospect for regional arrange-
ments in Asia, where political
and economic alignments 
are still very much in flux?
Principally, in terms of the rise
of China, it wouldn’t seem to
be in China’s interest to enter
into an arrangement now that
might keep it in its current
position in the hierarchy of Asia
when it assumes that it’s going
to be rising relatively fast. 
MERIT JANOW
I see China gaining on thediplomatic front, rather than
advancing an economic tem-
plate that is rigid and that binds
it to commitments that it may
find uncomfortable in the
future. So the ASEAN +3 agree-
ment is a modest liberalization
of tariffs in some areas. As for
the idea of closer economic
integration, I don’t see it as
having any consequences at all
that would oblige China to
make choices that could prove
uncomfortable under different
political configurations. That is
kind of the genius of it, in fact.
PETER DRYSDALE
It’s a very strategic position-ing on the part of China. 
It’s moving toward the Europe
of East Asia. This move is a
strategic vision, but it’s very
politically motivated as well. 
It’s not about maintaining
established relationships but 
of developing clearly a future
position for dealing with North
America. Why shouldn’t it be?
We would be much happier in
many ways if it were a stable
and ordered structure that
included Japan, Korea, and 
the rest of us.
QUESTION
Anumber of my friends inASEAN have said they
would like a framework agree-
ment with the United States.
This framework agreement
would not legally bind them,
but it provides an approach 
for the United States to be an
external partner of ASEAN.
What do you think about this
proposal? 
HUGH PATRICK
The beauty of frameworkagreements is that you
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don’t have to agree to anything.
That is to say, there are no
legal commitments to carry
through anything. In a funda-
mental way that has been both
the strength and the weakness
of APEC. APEC encompasses 
all of these countries; it is an
agreement of countries in the
region to get together, cooper-
ate, find areas where they can
do things mutually, voluntarily,
and consensually without any
legal sanctions or disciplines.
That, I would say, is the best
framework agreement there is,
and it’s the one that should be
built on. Whether the subre-
gional framework agreements
will add to that, I’m not sure.
They do have certain political
driving forces. The fact that
China signaled it was willing to
engage in a framework agree-
ment was very reassuring for
Southeast Asian leaders, appar-
ently. Addressing that sort of
political issue is very important.
Clearly, politics dominate
the economics on East Asian
and Asia Pacific economic
cooperation, and that’s proba-
bly appropriate. That suggests
that we— meaning the 
academic institutions as a
whole—should be holding
more conferences on the poli-
tics of these issues. This is
fundamental, and we econo-
mists on this panel have been
stressing these political issues
specifically, because they’re 
so important, even though we
can’t claim that that’s our
expertise.
QUESTION
Are FTAs slowing downfree trade, or are they
inevitable and necessary for
free trade? 
MERIT JANOW
I think the objective questionis whether FTAs are trade
creating or trade distorting.
There’s been a lot of work on
that, and it sort of depends on
which one you’re talking about.
There’s very little that one can
say with respect to those FTAs
that are in East Asia, because
they either don’t exist, they’re
so new, or they’re so small that
you can’t really worry about
them in a major sense, in terms
of the current trade effects.
I was speaking earlier about
whether or not FTAS were
intentionally diverting countries
from further liberalization initia-
tives on the multilateral front,
and to me that is a concern. I
don’t think that the incentives
are there for dealing with the
hard issues, except when you
expand the partners, so it’s hard
for me to imagine that major
agricultural reform will occur in
the absence of some sort of deal
inclusive of the United States and
the EU. For example, it is unlikely
that Japanese rice farmers would
unilaterally decide that rice
trade liberalization was okay. 
We saw in the Singapore
case, which was supposed to
be so easy, that goldfish and
orchards almost killed that deal
for a while. Japan and Mexico
got tripped up on orange juice.
But that doesn’t mean that
bilateral agreements are useless
or that there can’t be other 
constructive things that can be
done. They offer some room
for experimentation. All of
those other points are also
there, but at the end of the day,
do you see it as adding up to a
net plus or not? I think that’s
where the opinions divide.
QUESTION
The EU, which many con-sider was the best solution
to Europe’s problems, was cre-
ated because it was politically
driven. NAFTA is certainly sec-
ond best to what the Europeans
have done, because it is inher-
ently discriminatory. The
question is, why Asia can’t
move toward the first best 
solution? Or in other words,
why can’t Asia move toward a
common market? I think, fun-
damentally, that there’s a lack
of the same kind of political
impetus and political drive 
that was present in the entire
European story right through
the euro. It seems to me that
with the rivalries that one sees
in Asia today, one can hope
only for a third best kind of
network of discriminatory trade
arrangements that are not in
I think the 
objective question
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Asia and are not for the global
interest.
TAKATOSHI ITO
I’m not sure Europe is somuch better than NAFTA.
Yes, it is a customs union. The
movement of goods and peo-
ple is free. There’s no proof of
rules of origin required, but the
wall to the outside is high, and
they still put tariffs on automo-
biles. Any accession countries
have to conform to the tariff
that the EU 15 imposes, which
means that lower tariffs have to
be raised so countries can join
the EU. So I don’t see that the
EU is a first best solution until
the EU lowers those common
tariffs to the rest of the world 
to zero. I don’t see EU as such
a beautiful first best.
So nobody is first best. 
No one is a perfect model and, 
as you mentioned, common
agricultural policy is obviously
another shortcoming of Europe.
So Asia has admitted it wants a
model that is probably different
from Europe and different from
NAFTA, but I’m not so sure to
call it the third best.
PETER DRYSDALE
I’m happy to say that thecore of Europe is infinitely
better than NAFTA, and I think
there’s no doubt about that. But
what Europe is doing with the
periphery is a different thing
altogether, and that’s where the
problem is. For many years,
people have argued that East
Asia can’t have the same model
as Europe because of the struc-
ture, the character, and the
dynamics of the region. When
we think about where it might
be down the road, it’s going 
to remain very different from
Europe. What’s good for
Europe is not at all that sensi-
ble in East Asia. So East Asian
integration has got to have a
particularly East Asian character
to it because of its history, its
structure, and its dynamic.
There are different levels of
development, and countries
with different economies that
have joined the process over 
at different stages. But what 
is important is that there is a
common enterprise there, and,
as you suggest, I think at some
point in time a grand political
bargain is important to
entrench the process. That’s
what we still don’t quite have
in East Asia, although I’m confi-
dent that the forces are there to
provide a platform in the near
future. Despite all the prob-
lems, I wouldn’t want anyone
to go away from this meeting
thinking that I’m not optimistic
about where the East Asian
enterprise will go. It does
involve, however, a very big
breakthrough in China-Japan
relations.
18 Japan, APEC, and East Asian Economic Cooperation
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